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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2022

Exploiting ROLLO’s Constant-Time Implementations with a Single-Trace Analysis

Résumé

ROLLO was a candidate to the second round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process. In the last update in April 2020, there was a key encapsulation mechanism (ROLLO-I) and a public-key encryption scheme (ROLLO-II). In this paper, we propose an attack to recover the syndrome during the decapsulation process of ROLLO-I. From this syndrome, we explain how to recover the private key. We target two constant-time implementations: the C reference implementation and a C implementation available on GitHub. By getting power measurements during the execution of the Gaussian elimination function, we are able to extract on a single trace each element of the syndrome. This attack can also be applied to the decryption process of ROLLO-II.
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Dates et versions

hal-04166720 , version 1 (20-07-2023)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-04166720 , version 1

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Agathe Cheriere, Lina Mortajine, Tania Richmond, Nadia El Mrabet. Exploiting ROLLO’s Constant-Time Implementations with a Single-Trace Analysis. The Twelfth International Workshop on Coding and Cryptography (WCC 2022), Mar 2022, Rostock, Germany. ⟨hal-04166720⟩
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