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Article Dans Une Revue Social Choice and Welfare Année : 2014

Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?

Résumé

A Condorcet social choice procedure elects the candidate that beats every other candidate under simple majority when such a candidate exists. The reinforcement axiom roughly states that given two groups of individuals, if these two groups select the same alternative, then this alternative must also be selected by their union. Condorcet social choice procedures are known to violate this axiom. Our goal in this paper is to put this important voting theory result into perspective. We then proceed by evaluating how frequently this phenomenon is susceptible to occur.
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Dates et versions

hal-00914870 , version 1 (06-12-2013)

Identifiants

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Sébastien Courtin, Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou. Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?. Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, 42 (4), pp.927-940. ⟨10.1007/s00355-013-0758-7⟩. ⟨hal-00914870⟩
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