The Ising model is one of the most studied models in modern physics. However, the question of what model is the Ising model is a subject of disagreement in the philosophical litera- ture. For some, it is a toy model (e.g., Reutlinger, Hangleiter and Hartmann 2018), while for others, it is a minimal model (e.g., Elliott-Graves and Weisberg 2014, Batterman 2017). This difference in labelling the Ising model matters since these types of models can cover different epistemic functions, such as representation and explanation of physical phenomena. In this talk, we argue that disagreements on which model the Ising model is can be resolved by contextualizing its uses across history. Based on the historical analysis of Niss (2005, 2009, 2011), we first claim that the model can be legitimately qualified as a toy or a minimal model, depending on the context of its use (before and after the 1960s) and the physical phenomena for which it is used. Second, we take a step further and claim that the Ising model can also be construed as an approximate model made of Galilean idealizations, if we view it as Lenz and Ising developed it in the 1920s.