Cross-layer analysis of clock glitch fault injection while fetching variable-length instructions
Résumé
With the increasing complexity of embedded systems, the use of variable-length instruction sets has become essential, so that higher code density and better performance can be achieved.
Security aspects are closely linked, considering the continuous improvement of attack techniques and equipment.
Fault injection is among the most interesting and rising physical attack techniques.
However, hardware designers and software developers lack accurate fault models to evaluate the vulnerabilities of their designs or codes in the presence of such attacks.
In this article, we provide a proper characterization, at instruction set architecture (ISA) level, of several faulty behaviors that are experimentally observed when a processor running a variable-length instruction set is targeted.
We include the binary encoding of instructions, and show how the obtained behaviors depend on the alignment in memory.
Moreover, we give a deeper insight on previous results from the literature, that were still left unexplained.
Additionally, we move downward at system level and consider the register-transfer level (RTL) to perform RTL fault simulation; This enables a better understanding of the faults propagation, validate the inferred fault models at ISA level, and reveal the origin of such faults at microarchitectural level.
Finally, applying the given fault models leads us to provide vulnerability analysis on three different implementations of AES.
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