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Article Dans Une Revue Annals of Economics and Statistics Année : 2023

Comparing real and hypothetical incentives in giving and money burning experiments

Résumé

This paper examines experimentally how social and anti-social decisions respond to hypothetical or real incentives. Our experiment consists of three games: i) a Modified Dictator Game, ii) a Money Giving Game, and iii) a Money Burning Game. Although we find different size effects (quantitative differences) across treatments, our data indicate very similar directional changes (qualitative similarities) relative to initial endowment distribution and the price of the decision. These findings suggest that if we are mainly interested in qualitative (directional) findings, then using hypothetical incentives may be relevant and considered as a diluted version of the real ones.
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Dates et versions

hal-04534560 , version 1 (05-04-2024)

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David Masclet, Thérèse Rebière. Comparing real and hypothetical incentives in giving and money burning experiments. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2023, 152, pp.65. ⟨10.2307/48754785⟩. ⟨hal-04534560⟩
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