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Article Dans Une Revue International Game Theory Review Année : 2022

Market Exit and Minimax Regret

Gisèle Umbhauer
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Résumé

This paper shows how minimax regret sheds new light on an old economic topic, market-exit games. It focuses on wars of attrition, namely overcrowded duopoly markets where the strategic variable is the exit time. The only symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game studied is a mixed-strategy equilibrium that leads to a null expected payoff, i.e., the payoff a firm gets when it immediately exits the market. This result is not convincing, both from a behavioral and from a strategic viewpoint. The minimax regret approach that builds upon opposite regrets — exiting the market too late and exiting the market too early — is more convincing and ensures that both firms obtain a strictly positive expected payoff.
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Dates et versions

hal-04491262 , version 1 (05-03-2024)

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Gisèle Umbhauer. Market Exit and Minimax Regret. International Game Theory Review, 2022, 24 (04), pp.2250013. ⟨10.1142/S021919892250013X⟩. ⟨hal-04491262⟩
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