We introduce the concept of Intrusion Resilience Systems (IRS) for modern vehicles. An IRS is a middleware that enables running a vehicular application in a replicated way, i.e., as a Replicated State Machine, over several ECUs. By requiring the replicated processes to reach a form of Byzantine agreement before changing their local state, the IRS ensures the resilience of critical vehicular applications despite assumed faults or attacks, as long as threat assumptions are met. This position paper proposes the tentative architecture of IRS and discusses its conceptual feasibility and underlying challenges. Our study rides the mutation of modern vehicular environments, which are closing the gap between simple and resource-scarce 'real-time and embedded systems', and complex and powerful 'information technology' ones. We show that current architectures are becoming plausible for such modular fault and intrusion tolerance solutions-deemed too heavy in the past. Our conclusion is that this topic deserves more attention in both academia and industry.