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Article Dans Une Revue Mathematical Structures in Computer Science Année : 2017

On lookahead equilibria in congestion games

Résumé

We investigate the issues of existence and efficiency of lookahead equilibria in congestion games. Lookahead equilibria, whose study has been initiated by Mirrokni et al. (2012), correspond to the natural extension of pure Nash equilibria in which the players, when making use of global information in order to predict subsequent reactions of the other ones, have computationally limited capabilities.
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hal-02089397 , version 1 (03-04-2019)

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Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli. On lookahead equilibria in congestion games. Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, 2017, 27 (02), pp.197-214. ⟨10.1017/S0960129515000079⟩. ⟨hal-02089397⟩
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