Strategic voting in a social context: considerate equilibria - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2016

Strategic voting in a social context: considerate equilibria

Résumé

In a voting system, voters may adopt a strategic behaviour in order to manipulate the outcome of the election. This naturally entails a game theoretic conception of voting. The specificity of our work is that we embed the voting game into a social context where agents and their relations are given by a graph, i.e. a social network. We aim at integrating the information provided by the graph in a refinement of the game-theotical analysis of an election. We consider coalitional equilibria immune to deviations performed by realistic coalitions based on the social network, namely the cliques of the graph. Agents are not fully selfish as they have consideration for their relatives. The corresponding notion of equilibrium was introduced by Hoefer et al. [12] and called considerate equilibrium. We propose to study its existence and the ability of the agents to converge to such an equilibrium in strategic voting games using well-known voting rules: Plurality, Antiplurality, Plurality with runoff, Borda, k-approval, STV, Maximin and Copeland.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
FAIA285-1423.pdf (296.95 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Publication financée par une institution
Loading...

Dates et versions

hal-01392850 , version 1 (14-12-2016)

Identifiants

Citer

Laurent Gourvès, Julien Lesca, Anaelle Wilczynski. Strategic voting in a social context: considerate equilibria. ECAI 2016 - 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aug 2016, The Hague, Netherlands. pp.1423-1431, ⟨10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1423⟩. ⟨hal-01392850⟩
75 Consultations
334 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More