On the Two-user Multi-carrier Joint Channel Selection and Power Control Game
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a hierarchical game approach to model the energy efficiency maximization
problem where transmitters individually choose their channel assignment and power control. We conduct
a thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Interestingly, we formally show that a spectrum orthogonalization naturally occurs when users decide
sequentially about their transmitting carriers and powers, delivering a binary channel assignment. Both
analytical and simulation results are provided for assessing and improving the performances in terms
of energy efficiency and spectrum utilization between the simultaneous-move game (with synchronous
decision makers), the social welfare (in a centralized manner) and the proposed Stackelberg (hierarchical)
game. For the first time, we provide tight closed-form bounds on the spectral efficiency of such a model,
including correlation across carriers and users. We show that the spectrum orthogonalization capability
induced by the proposed hierarchical game model enables the wireless network to achieve the spectral
efficiency improvement while still enjoying a high energy efficiency.