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Conference Papers Year : 2015

Formal Analysis of E-Cash Protocols


Electronic cash (e-cash) aims at achieving client privacy at payment, similar to real cash. Several security protocols have been proposed to ensure privacy in e-cash, as well as the necessary unforgery properties. In this paper, we propose a formal framework to define, analyze, and verify security properties of e-cash systems. To this end, we model e-cash systems in the applied π-calculus, and we define two client privacy properties and three properties to prevent forgery. Finally, we apply our definitions to an e-cash protocol from the literature proposed by Chaum et al., which has two variants and a real implementation based on it. Using ProVerif, we demonstrate that our framework is suitable for an automated analysis of this protocol.
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hal-01337410 , version 1 (25-06-2016)



Jannik Dreier, Ali Kassem, Pascal Lafourcade. Formal Analysis of E-Cash Protocols. 12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2015), Jul 2015, Colmar, France. ⟨10.5220/0005544500650075⟩. ⟨hal-01337410⟩
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