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Journal Articles Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Year : 2010

Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information

Abstract

We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first- price auction is not aff ected by identity independent price externalities while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, identity dependent price externalities a ect the outcome of both auction formats. In any case, the second-price auction exacerbates the eff ects of price externalities.
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Dates and versions

hal-00701295 , version 1 (25-05-2012)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00701295 , version 1

Cite

David Ettinger. Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2010, 166 (2), pp.365-385. ⟨hal-00701295⟩
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