Area Optimization of Cryptographic Co-Processors Implemented in Dual-Rail with Precharge Positive Logic
Résumé
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) become very popular for embedded cryptographic operations. In order to resist side-channel attacks, FPGAs must implement reasoned countermeasures. The most efficient way to mitigate attacks is to adopt a gate-level protection. Two secure gates families exist: those that ``hide'' and those that ``mask'' side-channel leakage. In this article, we detail methods to reduce the size of wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL) implementations. These circuits are designed to hide any physical leak by ensuring a data-independent activity. This study is meant to be generic, and thus applies to any $4 \to 1$ LUT-based FPGAs. Further optimizations can be reached by taking advantage of some FPGAs proprietary features. Our solutions include RTL code modification, synthesizer usage (potentially in a re-entrant way), and ad hoc mapping. We show that linear parts of algorithms can be delegated to a synthesizer, but that non-linear parts are better off to be handled with heuristics. We present a 23% area gain over the state-of-the-art as for the positive WDDL triple-DES symmetric encryption algorithm.
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