Concepts are Not a Natural Kind - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Philosophy of Science Année : 2004

Concepts are Not a Natural Kind

Edouard Machery
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

Machery Edouard (2004) Concepts are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science. Full text available as: Adobe PDF Abstract: In cognitive psychology, concepts are those data structures that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings' higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning...). Most psychologists of concepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties. Psychologists assume thereby that concepts constitute a natural kind. I call this assumption the Natural Kind Assumption. This article challenges the Natural Kind Assumption. It is argued that a growing body of evidence suggests that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. Hence, the notion of concept is inappropriate to carve human beings'

Domaines

Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
ijn_00000535_00.pdf (231.44 Ko) Télécharger le fichier

Dates et versions

ijn_00000535 , version 1 (18-09-2004)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : ijn_00000535 , version 1

Citer

Edouard Machery. Concepts are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science, 2004. ⟨ijn_00000535⟩

Collections

OMNIPHILO
54 Consultations
92 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More