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Article Dans Une Revue Philosophiques Année : 2000

Qui a peur des qualia corporels?

Jérôme Dokic

Résumé

Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain "inside" and perceiving it "outside" (seeing oneself or another in pain). I sketch another reductionist analysis which is compatible with materialism, and according to which the intentional object of bodily awareness, unlike that of external perception, constitutively depends on the subject's experience.

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ijn_00000138 , version 1 (05-09-2002)

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Jérôme Dokic. Qui a peur des qualia corporels?. Philosophiques, 2000, 27 (1), pp.77-98. ⟨ijn_00000138⟩
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