Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2025

Minimizing Rosenthal's Potential in Monotone Congestion Games

Résumé

Congestion games are attractive because they can model many concrete situations where some competing entities interact through the use of some shared resources, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibria which correspond to the local minima of a potential function. We explore the problem of computing a state of minimum potential in this setting. Using the maximum number of resources that a player can use at a time, and the possible symmetry in the players' strategy spaces, we settle the complexity of the problem for instances having monotone (i.e., either non-decreasing or non-increasing) latency functions on their resources. The picture, delineating polynomial and NP-hard cases, is complemented with tight approximation algorithms.

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hal-05368640 , version 1 (17-11-2025)

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  • HAL Id : hal-05368640 , version 1

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Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Laurent Gourvès, Christos Tsoufis, Cosimo Vinci. Minimizing Rosenthal's Potential in Monotone Congestion Games. Proc. of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2025), May 2025, Detroit, United States. ⟨hal-05368640⟩
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