What are the determinants of permanent and temporary non take-up of the French minimum social benefit?
Résumé
We investigate the determinants of non-take-up of the French minimum social benefit (Revenu de Solidarité Active [RSA], Active Solidarity Income) using the Tax and Social Income Survey and distinguishing between people in situations of either permanent or temporary eligibility. We use the monthly dimension of the dataset in order to study the dynamics of non-take-up. We find that poverty levels in the department of residence and having two or more children decrease the probability of RSA non-take-up, in cases where individuals are permanently or temporarily eligible while professional inactivity, having rental resources and being in a couple increase the likelihood of submitting a claim in both cases. In the case of permanent eligibility, we find that RSA non-take-up in a given quarter increases the probability of non-take-up in the following quarter. Moreover, the amount of the RSA, the level of sanctions, residing in a priority district and the "back and forth" between claimants and social agencies are important factors affecting non-take-up in the case of permanent eligibility while take-up for the Activity Bonus and social agencies' credibility in delivering accurate and reliable information, are salient in the temporary eligibility case.
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