Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2012

Random aggregation without the Pareto principle

Résumé

Barberà-Sonnenschein (J Econ Theory 18:244–254, 1978) have shown that any binary and Paretian random social choice function can be associated with a mapping which associates a real number with each coalition of individuals. This function gives, for each coalition, the power that this group has in imposing on society, their common preference relation on a pair of alternatives. The aim of this paper is to extend this result, showing that the Pareto criterion is not a necessary condition for the existence of such a coalitional power function.

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Dates et versions

hal-04876964 , version 1 (09-01-2025)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04876964 , version 1

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Jérémy Picot. Random aggregation without the Pareto principle. Journées de l'Association Française de Sciences Économiques (AFSE), Sep 2012, Paris, France. ⟨hal-04876964⟩
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