This case is taken as an illustration for the issue that this article seeks to address: why is the principle of distinction in IHL so difficult to apply in Lebanon? It will be argued that in Lebanon the distinction falls short because refugees have always been considered as potential combatants. As a matter of fact, when we look at Lebanon’s history, we find that the blurred lines that challenge the principle of distinction between a civilian and a combatant have existed for almost as long as the state has been independent. The article is divided into three parts. First, I argue that recognizing the contingent emergence of the principle of distinction in IHL helps to understand why the figure of the militarized refugee appears as an oxymoron. I detail what the principle of distinction is about and what the existing guidelines are for its application. Then I present the Lebanese case: a historical and contextual account permits us to discuss the paradigmatic ambiguity of the militarized refugee. Indeed, the securitization of Lebanon’s policy towards refugees is contradictory to the rationale of the IHL principle. I provide insights into the militarization of Syrian refugees and explain the securitization policy by looking at the history of the Palestinian guerrillas and the contested hegemonic influence of Syria over Lebanon. I conclude that the apparent ambiguity raised by the figure of the militarized refugee and the subsequent misfit between theory and practice is due to a failure to acknowledge refugees’ agency.