The northern Irish question stems from competing and conflicting interpretations of History and therefore of antagonistic perceptions of national identities. Contemporary Irish republicanism is from an ideological point of view one of these interpretations. It has long been characterised by numerous and bloody splits as its ideological corpus was not negotiable, any major concession –as it was the case with the 1921 Treaty establishing the Free State- being considered as treason of the messianic ideal. Yet the hunger strikes and a changing international environment progressively led Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA to sketch out and then assert a new strategy that eventually to the Good Friday Agreement. This approach also meant substituting inclusive politics to the “armed struggle”, and it has proved successful as Sinn Fein is now the major party in Ireland as a whole in terms of electoral weight, though it remains far from achieving an overall majority on both sides of the border. Whether this process of “normalisation” reflects a deep change in the ideological corpus or a mere strategy to reach out to the ultimate goal of reunification is put to the test by Brexit. Over the last seven years there have been serious concerns that the return of a hard border may signal the beginning of a new cycle of violence. This scenario has not materialised so far despite tensions, and the message conveyed by the political crisis is quite clear: Sinn Fein privileges a pragmatic approach as confrontation would be counter productive. Polls suggest too many voters north and south are yet undecided, yet Brexit is seen as a catalyst that may speed up the process of reunification. The clock is apparently ticking in their favour so republicans have no reason to give loyalists an excuse for the return of violent politics, all the more since their electoral fortunes diverge to the advantage of Sinn Fein. Obviously, this is walking on the thin edge, as much rests on the balance of strength that has come out of the last elections in Northern Ireland. The question is whether Sinn Fein’s positive dynamics would survive the crash test of a referendum on self-determination. The latter has no chance to see light in the present circumstances given the staunch opposition of the present conservative government, and the more than probable reluctance of the Irish coalition government. The situation may well be different within the next couple of years as general elections loom large over both the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Two pre-conditions would however be required : first an overall SF majority in the South elected on an integrated Ireland agenda, second a clear pro-reunification majority in the North, which does not yet exist. Then Sinn Fein’s inclusive policies would have to face the challenge of desperate hardline minority loyalist opposition.