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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2024

On-chip Traffic Injection to Counteract Timing Side-Channel Attacks

Résumé

Security has become a major concern in the last decade, specially with the increment of low-level attack vectors present in COTS MPSoCs. Safety-relevant systems are not an exception, and they are also exposed to security concerns. Sidechannel attacks (SCAs) in general, and cache-based SCAs in particular, have gained prominent importance due to the proliferation of cache memories for increased performance. However, there are a plethora of such attacks and effective countermeasures are needed for all of those. This paper investigates the effectiveness of using hardware traffic injectors to counteract those attacks with the aim of assessing to what extent those can be effective. In particular, we consider the SafeTI, an open source traffic injector developed by us, and assess to what extent attack-specific traffic patterns can defeat Bernstein’s SCA targeting an AES-128 encryption process in a space-relevant platform based on Frontgrade Gaisler’s IPs.
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Dates et versions

hal-04614786 , version 1 (17-06-2024)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04614786 , version 1

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Francisco Fuentes, Sergi Alcaide, Raimon Casanova, Jaume Abella. On-chip Traffic Injection to Counteract Timing Side-Channel Attacks. ERTS2024, Jun 2024, Labège, Toulouse, France. pp.197-208. ⟨hal-04614786⟩

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