On preventive behavior – An experimental invesigation on self-protection
Abstract
Preventive behavior in a sense of self-protection is defined as the
action taken by an agent, at a cost, to mitigate the probability of an
adverse consequence. Yet, even though these behaviors are
widespread in economic life, it has never been studied in a
controlled environment. We propose to do so by first clarifying the
theoretical predictions in various theoretical frameworks (expected
utility, rank-dependent utility, prospect theory), and second to test
experimentally these predictions. More specifically, we study the
cost that makes the decision-maker indifferent with a fixed change
of the probability of the adverse consequence. At the
theoretical level, we show that under expected utility, the intensity
of prevention action decreases with the probability of the adverse
consequence, while for rank-dependent expected utility and
prospect theory, the main determinant of prevention is the derivative
of the probability weighting function, leading to a U shape form of
prevention. Experimentally, our results suggest that prevention is
mostly driven by the shape of the probability weighting function, a
result that seemed to have been overlooked in the literature, that
has mostly focused on the curvature of the utility function