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Chapitre D'ouvrage Année : 2021

Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results

Résumé

This chapter is a companion paper of Barthélémy et al. (2019) which studies the role of the quota on the occurrence of “dummy” players in small weighted voting games (i.e., in voting games with 3, 4 or 5 players). We here extend the results obtained in this paper by considering voting games with a larger number of players (up to 15). It is shown that the probability of having a player without voting power is very sensitive to the choice of the quota and the quota values that minimize this probability are derived.

Dates et versions

hal-04486191 , version 1 (01-03-2024)

Identifiants

Citer

Fabrice Barthélémy, Mathieu Martin. Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results. Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Springer International Publishing, pp.299-315, 2021, Studies in Choice and Welfare, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_13⟩. ⟨hal-04486191⟩
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