Labor Markets, Wage Inequality, and Hiring Selection* - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2024

Labor Markets, Wage Inequality, and Hiring Selection*

Résumé

Employers hire more selectively between heterogeneous productivity workers when applicants' queues are longer. Consistently, CPS data reveal a positive and concave relation between unemployment rates and wage inequality. We rationalize intuition and evidence altogether using a nonsequential search model in which selective hiring stretches out the right tail of the wage distribution and compresses the left one. Using GMMestimated parameters, we show that mean worker productivity distribution shifts are consistent with the evidence. Welfare analysis suggests that regressive taxation may enhance efficiency because expected good matches stimulate vacancies, creating a positive externality for other job seekers.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
selection inequality.pdf (1.66 Mo) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-04481359 , version 1 (28-02-2024)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-04481359 , version 1

Citer

Alessandra Pizzo, Benjamin Villena. Labor Markets, Wage Inequality, and Hiring Selection*. 2024. ⟨hal-04481359⟩
45 Consultations
22 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More