Intuitionnisme dialogique et pré-propositionnalité
Résumé
Our purpose here is to return to an obviousness which we propose to consider as debatable. The fact that the processes of intuitionism come into conflict with certain laws of classical logic would justify-it is thought-to reform the latter, in order to remove the reasons for the conflict and to establish the reasonings of which intuitionism consists on a logic that be itself intuitionist. Going against this way of apprehending the relationship between intuition and logic, we propose to develop the idea that the conflict between a properly intuitionist mathematics and the classical logic does not have to be suppressed, insofar as it is the expression of a dynamic tension, which-one is entitled to make the hypothesis-represents the very essence of the act by which Brouwer instituted-in a spirit of rupture-intuitionism. Then, we attempt to show that, provided it is thought of dialogically, intuitionism opens up avenues for a renewal of the concept of phenomenological reduction.
Domaines
Sciences de l'Homme et SociétéOrigine | Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s) |
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