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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2023

Thwarting Timing Attacks in Microcontrollers using Fine-grained Hardware Protections

Résumé

Timing side-channels are an identified threat for security critical software. Existing countermeasures have a cost either on the hardware requirements or execution time. We focus on low-cost microcontrollers that have a very low computational capacity. Although these processors do not feature out-of-order execution or speculation, they remain vulnerable to timing attacks exploiting the varying latencies of ALU operations or memory accesses. We propose to augment the RISC-V ISA with security primitives that have a guaranteed timing behavior. These primitives allow constant time ALU operations and memory accesses that do not alter the state of the cache. Our approach has a low overhead in terms of hardware cost, binary code size, and execution time both for the constant time secure program and other programs running concurrently on the same hardware.
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Dates et versions

hal-04424956 , version 1 (29-01-2024)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-04424956 , version 1

Citer

Nicolas Gaudin. Thwarting Timing Attacks in Microcontrollers using Fine-grained Hardware Protections. CYBERUS summer school, Université Bretagne Sud, Jul 2023, Lorient (56100), France. ⟨hal-04424956⟩
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