Refutazioni egologiche e questionari heideggeriani.
Résumé
In Being and Time, Heidegger presents the whole of post-Cartesian metaphysics as incapable of explicitly adressing
the questionof being as such. He thus describes modern metaphysics as implicitly bound to the quite traditional sense of being as presence, applyed it to the being of the ego cogito now understood as a fundamentum inconcussum. For his part, in his lectures on Metaphysics, Brentano, not unlike Descartes, inends to take up the Aristotelian science of being as such based on the evidence measured by the cogitationes that appear to internal perception. By doing so he thus examines the relationship between ‘ego’ and ‘sum’ on the background of a wide array of skeptical objections. But what then does ego sum mean? More importantly, how far does the analogy between Brentano and Descartes (for whom the ego sum is actually a fundamentum inconcussum) actually go? Finally, in Brentano, is the sense of ‘sum’ relative to such a ‘cogito’ really so implicit? And can it be said that such a sense fully corresponds to the sense of being as being present? Through a detailed reconstruction of the Brentanian arguments
advanced in his lectures on Metaphysics, we will try to test the limits of Heidegger’s diagnosis of modern metaphysics by asking if and to what extent it actually clarifies the nature of Brentano’s project or, instead, conceals some of its most original aspects.