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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Mathematical Economics Année : 2015

Network games with incomplete information

Résumé

We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players’ information. We demonstrate that there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium effort of each agent is a weighted combinations of different Katz–Bonacich centralities.
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Dates et versions

hal-04329656 , version 1 (07-12-2023)

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Joan de Martí, Yves Zenou. Network games with incomplete information. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, 61, pp.221-240. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.002⟩. ⟨hal-04329656⟩
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