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Article Dans Une Revue Theoretical Economics Année : 2021

Simple bets to elicit private signals

Résumé

This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms, Top-Flop and Threshold betting, to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents' private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide micro-economic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other agents in a game setting. Our mechanisms relax standard assumptions of the literature, such as common prior, and homogeneous and risk neutral agents.
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Dates et versions

hal-04325606 , version 1 (06-12-2023)

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Aurélien Baillon, Yan Xu. Simple bets to elicit private signals. Theoretical Economics, 2021, 16 (3), pp.777-797. ⟨10.3982/TE4343⟩. ⟨hal-04325606⟩
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