People are faster to perform a precision grip when they see a cherry (i.e., a small graspable object) than to perform a power grip, and the reverse holds true when they see an apple (i.e., a large graspable object). This potentiation effect supports that object representations could include motor components that would be simulated when a graspable object is seen. However, the nature of these motor components remains unclear. The embodied account posits that seeing an object only potentiates the most frequent actions associated with it (i.e., usual actions). In contrast, the size-coding account posits that seeing an object potentiates any actions associated to spatial codes compatible with those associated to the objects. We conducted three experiments to disentangle these two alternative accounts. We especially varied the nature of the responses while participants saw either large or small graspable objects. Our results showed a potentiation effect when participants performed the usual grasping actions (Experiment 1: power and precision grip) but also when they performed unusual grasping actions (Experiment 2: grasping between the thumb and little finger) and even when they had to perform non-grasping actions (Experiment 3: pointing actions). By supporting the size-coding account, our contribution underlines the need for a better understanding of the nature of the motor components of object representations and for using a proper control condition (i.e., pointing action) before arguing that the embodied account convincingly explains the potentiation effect of grasping behaviors.