The current research investigates the effects of corporate governance on Real Earnings Management (REM) practices for French -listed companies and considers the moderating effect of political connection on this relationship. Using a sample of 200 companies from CAC All Tradable index during the period 2005 and 2017, we find mixed evidence. First, our results show that CEO duality is negatively associated with abnormal operating cash flow and positively associated with abnormal production, suggesting that CEO duality of French companies increases one form and decreases another form of REM. Second, we find a negative relationship between board independence and REM practices, supporting the monitoring role of independent directors in constraining REM activities is effective. Third, the results show a negative association between ownership concentration and REM activities, which is in the line with the efficient monitoring hypothesis of controlling shareholders. Furthermore, the results of the moderating effect of political connection on the relationship between corporate governance and REM show that corporate governance exacerbates REM practices, which provides support to the grabbing hand hypothesis of politicians. However, we document that French institutional investor play an active role in monitoring CEO activities and limiting their opportunistic behavior even in the presence of politically connected board/CEO, which turns to be the most efficient corporate governance mechanism in reducing REM practices.