Are near-death experiences induced deficit correlations in embodiment?
Résumé
There is no consensus about the definition of near-death experiences (NDEs). This article argues for their classification as a phenomenon of psychophysical dissociation induced by deficit correlations between an individual's self-model and world-model. The phenomenological heterogeneity of NDEs has been identified by many authors since the 19th century, and interpreted by the philosopher Henri Bergson as a decoupling of two forms of consciousness that are usually interconnected for embodiment. We suggest calling hyperembodied consciousness the experience of enhanced cognitive, perceptual and motor functions, and disembodied consciousness the loosening of the relationship between mind and body. The complementarity of these two processes seems to provide an evolutionary advantage as this dissociation phenomenon favors rescue actions. We also discuss an alternative classification, i.e.to consider NDEs outside categorial exceptional experiences.