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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2023

A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

Résumé

We adapt the methods from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Under a combination of (a slight strengthening of) the assumptions of Benoît and Krishna (1985) and those of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), a folk theorem follows. Three counterexamples show that our assumptions are tight.

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Dates et versions

hal-04219457 , version 1 (27-09-2023)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04219457 , version 1

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Johannes Hörner, Jerôme Renault. A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring. 2023. ⟨hal-04219457⟩
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