Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Economics Letters Année : 2023

Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals

Résumé

We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We reconsider the issue of non-existence of an equilibrium as first raised by Myerson (1982). In the context of his example, we establish the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We clarify that Myerson (1982)’s non-existence result is an implication of the additional requirement he imposes, that each principal selects his preferred continuation equilibrium in the agents’ game.

Dates et versions

hal-04216626 , version 1 (25-09-2023)

Identifiants

Citer

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser. Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals. Economics Letters, 2023, 222, pp.110932. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110932⟩. ⟨hal-04216626⟩
18 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More