The surge in economic globalization after the end of the Cold War created interdependences with enormous geopolitical ramifications, notably the weaponizing of interdependence via control of economic nodes. COVID and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has further demonstrated the importance as well as vulnerability of global supply chains. Recognizing these risks, the EU has launched a number of initiatives to prevent the weaponizing of supply chains and build resilience against interruptions and accidental chokepoints. This paper explores the EU’s attempts to ensure security of supply in three particularly vulnerable and strategic sectors since COVID and the war in Ukraine: semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and rare earths. The analysis examines the Critical Raw Materials Act, the European Chips Act, and the Pharmaceutical Strategy to assess the complex political and diplomatic trade-offs involved in what are often seen as primarily economic policies. On closer investigation, it is apparent that the EU’s moves to reduce strategic dependence is born of fear that crucial global supply chains are inherently subject to political risk, which in turn could stoke a backlash against the EU at home. Seen from the perspective of the debate over the future of the liberal international order, the EU’s new “geo-dirigisme” implies also a questioning of the EU’s place in this order. If embedded liberalism meant preserving a space for national redistributive policies, embedding security of supply means carving out a space for states to insure against the pitfalls of interdependence. Consequently, as the EU and others take measures to address security of supply without relying purely on globalized supply chains, the liberal international order faces the acid test of its coordination capacity.