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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2008

Permanence and innovation in central banking policy for financial stability

Michel Aglietta
  • Fonction : Auteur
  • PersonId : 995453
Laurence Scialom
  • Fonction : Auteur
  • PersonId : 1016640

Résumé

In the first part of this paperer, we emphasize the adaptability and continuity of the lender-of-last-resort doctrine beyond the diversity of financial structures from the 19th century to the present day.. The second part deals with the global credit crisis and the analysis of the central banks' innovative practices during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We highlight that the lender of last resort's role is not confined to providing emergency liquidity. It aims to provide orderly deleveraging in the financial system in order to preserve the financial intermediation process. Our conclusion underlines that the crisis management has become global and strategic. It opens the way to a major regulatory and supervisory reform.
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Dates et versions

hal-04140738 , version 1 (26-06-2023)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04140738 , version 1

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Michel Aglietta, Laurence Scialom. Permanence and innovation in central banking policy for financial stability. 2008. ⟨hal-04140738⟩
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