Collusion and Predation Under Cournot Competition - Archive ouverte HAL
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Working Paper) Année : 2022

Collusion and Predation Under Cournot Competition

Résumé

This paper studies how predation strategies can affect the sustainability of collusion. We demonstrate that in the presence of few competitors collusion may be sustained at equilibrium for intermediate discount factors. In such instances predation implies that punishment strategies will yield low subgame perfect payoffs, thereby making collusion easier to sustain. For low discount factors collusion is not sustainable because of the high incentives to deviate to Cournot-Nash strategies. Moreover, for high discount factors it is always optimal to predate colluding firms, thus contrasting with much of the earlier literature showing that collusion is only achievable by sufficiently patient firms.
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hal-04079810 , version 1 (24-04-2023)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04079810 , version 1

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Emilie Dargaud, Maxime Menuet, Petros G Sekeris. Collusion and Predation Under Cournot Competition. 2022. ⟨hal-04079810⟩
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