Despite their high moral and legal value within the Member States, national systems of protection of fundamental rights are bound to be reduced to their bare bones in the EU framework. In that context, to what extent may Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ( ‘ the Charter ’ ) alter that statement ? Could that formally EU law provision be relied on materially in order to apply higher national standards of protection, at the possible expense of a certain construction of EU principles ? How could that work in practice, and what would be the theoretical consequences for the legal nature of the EU, in particular for EU constitutionalism ? In its current interpretation by the Court of Justice, Article 53 of the Charter is deprived of any real added value inasmuch as the application of national standards of fundamental rights is permitted (or prohibited) by the logic inherent in the EU, irrespective of Article 53. Yet, Article 53 of the Charter has introduced a pluralist dimension because of its materially national content (respect for substantive national rights) within a formally EU shell (Article 53 belongs to the Charter). As a consequence, the interpretation of Article 53 should rather be reoriented in order to allow, in certain circumstances, for the application of national (higher) standards of rights, even where the orthodox EU understanding precludes it, such as in fully harmonised areas.