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Article Dans Une Revue Adaptive Behavior Année : 2021

Steering a middle course between intentionality and representation: some remarks about John Stewart’s enactive stance

Résumé

John Stewart commits himself to the defence of a demanding version of enaction. Among its many original features, John’s version of enaction includes a questionable form of anti-representationalism, and leaves room for the Varelian idea that intentionality is a biological property. This stance anticipates contemporary endorsements in 4E cognition of intentionality as a non-representational and non-contentful property. Once it is deprived of its representational tinsels, intentionality appears to us again as a property of object-directedness. Nevertheless, is the autopoietic model of intentionality as object-directedness coherent and convincing? And do we need intentionality when we describe the meaningful relations between organisms and their environments? The article seeks to answer to these questions.
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Dates et versions

hal-04063850 , version 1 (10-04-2023)

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Pierre Steiner. Steering a middle course between intentionality and representation: some remarks about John Stewart’s enactive stance. Adaptive Behavior, 2021, 29 (5), pp.471-483. ⟨10.1177/1059712319865741⟩. ⟨hal-04063850⟩
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