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Chapitre D'ouvrage Année : 2020

Reference and Singular Thought

Résumé

Within a structured proposition framework, it is customary to phrase the reference/description contrast in terms of distinct types of propositional constituent. The idea that the semantic contribution of a referring expression—its content—is directly an object raises a fundamental objection, due to Frege. The mental file idea was first introduced in a descriptivist framework. Because the knowledge of the reference associated with a proper name typically involves a rich body of information rather than a single identifying description, a variant of the Fregean approach has emphasized the fact that the descriptions associated with proper names come in clusters. An important aspect of the framework is that, in order to play their part, mental files need to stand in relation to the entities they refer to, via the epistemically rewarding relation which the subject deploying the file stands in to these entities.

Domaines

Philosophie
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Dates et versions

hal-04032363 , version 1 (04-04-2023)

Identifiants

Citer

François Recanati. Reference and Singular Thought. Stephen Biggs; Heimir Geirsson. The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference, Routledge, pp.399-408, 2020, ⟨10.4324/9781003111894-39⟩. ⟨hal-04032363⟩
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