Patocka, Merleau-Ponty et la question des limites de la phénoménologie
Résumé
The purpose of this paper is to lay out the similarities between the
philosophical projects of Patočka and Merleau-Ponty, with respect to the
question of the “limits of phenomenology”. We suggest that both these
authors propose two complementary strategies in their attempt of overcoming
the Husserlian phenomenology. The first one consists in extending the field of
phenomenology so as for it to be able to encompass phenomena either
insufficiently explored or misinterpreted by the conceptuality that Husserl
put forth; the second strategy, more ambitious, aims to overpass the very
standpoint of phenomenology in favour of an ontological approach. We try to
show that what profoundly motivates these attempts is a radical – and hence,
ontological – reinterpretation of the Lebenswelt.