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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2023

Envy driven dynamics in single peaked, single crossing cheap talk games

Stéphan Sémirat

Résumé

We study pure perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) in Sender-Receiver games with finitely many types for the Sender. Such equilibria are characterized by incentive compatible (IC) partitions of the Sender's types, in which an optimal action for the Receiver is associated with every cell of the partition and types do not envy each other. In the case of ordered types, real valued actions and single-peaked, single-crossing utility functions, we construct sequences of partitions by making recursive use of the possible envy of some Sender's types. When initialized at the fully separating partition, every sequence converges to a unique IC partition. The achieved partition survives many selection criteria for cheap talk games.
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Dates et versions

hal-03997653 , version 1 (20-02-2023)

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  • HAL Id : hal-03997653 , version 1

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Stéphan Sémirat. Envy driven dynamics in single peaked, single crossing cheap talk games. Colibri Focus Workshop on Strategic Communication, Feb 2023, Graz, Austria. ⟨hal-03997653⟩

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