A mean-field game of market-making against strategic traders - Archive ouverte HAL
Article Dans Une Revue SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics Année : 2022

A mean-field game of market-making against strategic traders

Bastien Baldacci
  • Fonction : Auteur
Dylan Possamaï
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

We design a market-making model \`a la Avellaneda-Stoikov in which the market-takers act strategically, in the sense that they design their trading strategy based on an exogenous trading signal. The market-maker chooses her quotes based on the average market-takers' behaviour, modelled through a mean-field interaction. We derive, up to the resolution of a coupled HJB--Fokker--Planck system, the optimal controls of the market-maker and the representative market-taker. This approach is flexible enough to incorporate different behaviours for the market-takers and takes into account the impact of their strategies on the price process.

Dates et versions

hal-03941548 , version 1 (16-01-2023)

Identifiants

Citer

Bastien Baldacci, Philippe Bergault, Dylan Possamaï. A mean-field game of market-making against strategic traders. SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics, 2022, 14 (4), pp.1080-1112. ⟨10.1137/22M1486492⟩. ⟨hal-03941548⟩
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