The Value of a Life-Year and the Intuition of Universality - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy Année : 2022

The Value of a Life-Year and the Intuition of Universality

Résumé

When considering the social valuation of a life-year, there is a conflict between two basic intuitions: on the one hand, the intuition of universality, according to which the value of an additional life-year should be universal, and, as such, should be invariant to the context considered; on the other hand, the intuition of complementarity, according to which the value of a life-year should depend on what this extra-life-year allows for, and, hence, on the quality of that life-year, because the quantity of life and the quality of life are complement to each other. This paper proposes three distinct accounts of the intuition of universality, and shows that those accounts either conflict with a basic monotonicity property, or lead to indifference with respect to how life-years are distributed within the population. Those results support the abandon of the intuition of universality. But abandoning the intuition of universality does not prevent a social evaluator from giving priority, when allocating life-years, to individuals with the lowest quality of life.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
Neutrality24-02-2021.pdf (278.07 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-03907536 , version 1 (20-12-2022)

Licence

Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Pas de modification

Identifiants

Citer

Marc Fleurbaey, Gregory Ponthiere. The Value of a Life-Year and the Intuition of Universality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2022, 22 (3), pp.355-381. ⟨10.26556/jesp.v22i3.1768⟩. ⟨hal-03907536⟩
11 Consultations
36 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More