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Article Dans Une Revue Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Année : 2020

The Two Faces of Mental Imagery

Margherita Arcangeli

Résumé

Mental imagery has often been taken to be equivalent to "sensory imagination", the perception-like type of imagination at play when, for example, one visually imagines a flower when none is there, or auditorily imagines a music passage while wearing earplugs. I contend that the equation of mental imagery with sensory imagination stems from a confusion between two senses of mental imagery. In the first sense, mental imagery is used to refer to a psychological attitude, which is perception-like in nature. In the second sense, mental imagery refers to a mental content, which can be grasped via different attitudes. I will show that failure to acknowledge the distinction between these senses of mental imagery has muddled philosophical discussion. This distinction brings much needed clarity to debates where sensory imagination and mental imagery are invoked, shedding light on issues such as the nature of imagistic mental states, and the representational powers and limits of mental imagery. I will conclude by sketching a general attitudinal account of imagination that does justice to both senses of mental imagery, outlining a promising framework for understanding imagination.

Domaines

Philosophie
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Dates et versions

hal-03905640 , version 1 (18-12-2022)

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  • HAL Id : hal-03905640 , version 1

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Margherita Arcangeli. The Two Faces of Mental Imagery. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2020, 101 (2), pp.304-322. ⟨hal-03905640⟩
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