The causal role(s) of intentions
Résumé
In her commentary on my target article, Dreßing suggests that the story I offer is not just a creation myth but
also an attempt to give an explanation of the function of conscious intentions in the physical world and as such answerable to both metaphysical and empirical constraints. Here, I try to clarify which of my claims should be understood as simply speculations about the origins of our capacity of intentions and which I take to be empirical claims. In response to the metaphysical and empirical challenge Dreßing raises, I argue that Dretske’s distinction between structuring and triggering causes may help us see how explanations in terms of physical properties and explanations in terms of mental properties may not compete but rather complement each other. I argue that this distinction may also help us assuage
certain worries raised by neuroscientific findings.
Domaines
PhilosophieOrigine | Fichiers éditeurs autorisés sur une archive ouverte |
---|