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Article Dans Une Revue American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Année : 2022

On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms

Résumé

In private-value auction environments, Chung and Ely (2007) establish maxmin and Bayesian foundations for dominant-strategy mechanisms. We first show that similar foundation results for ex post mechanisms hold true even with interdependent values if the interdependence is only cardinal. This includes, for example, the one-dimensional environments of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Bergemann and Morris (2009b). Conversely, if the environment exhibits ordinal interdependence, which is typically the case with multi-dimensional environments (e.g., a player’s private information)
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Dates et versions

hal-03863573 , version 1 (21-11-2022)

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Takuro Yamashita, Shuguang Zhu. On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, 14 (4), pp.494-514. ⟨10.1257/mic.20200174⟩. ⟨hal-03863573⟩
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