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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Année : 2022

Competition, Information, and the Erosion of Morals

Résumé

We study the impact of competition on morals using a dynamic variant of the die-under-the-cup task. Players can repeatedly misreport the outputs of consecutive die rolls to earn more money, either under an individual piece-rate pay scheme or in a two-player tournament. In this dynamic setting, we disentangle the effect of the incentive scheme and the effect of information provision about one's relative performance, by comparing settings with continuous vs. final ex post feedback on the counterpart's reported outcome. We find that individuals lie more under competitive rather than non-competitive incentive schemes, but only if both players can cheat in the tournament. Continuous feedback on the counterpart's reports does not increase cheating in the tournament, while it does under the piece-rate scheme. These findings shed light on the effects that different competition and information policies have on morals in occupational settings.
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Dates et versions

hal-03805532 , version 1 (07-10-2022)

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Julien Benistant, Fabio Galeotti, Marie Claire Villeval. Competition, Information, and the Erosion of Morals. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2022, 204, pp.148-163. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.008⟩. ⟨hal-03805532⟩
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