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Article Dans Une Revue American Economic Review Année : 2022

Taxes and turnout: when the decisive voter stays at home

Résumé

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout andendogenous platforms. Parties trade o incentivizing their supporters to voteand discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We showthat the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge inthe political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead tothe adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobi-lize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributivetaxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voterswho are demobilized.

Dates et versions

hal-03800580 , version 1 (06-10-2022)

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Felix Bierbrauer, Aleh Tsyvinski, Nicolas Werquin. Taxes and turnout: when the decisive voter stays at home. American Economic Review, 2022, 112 (2), pp.689-719. ⟨10.1257/aer.20171927⟩. ⟨hal-03800580⟩
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