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Article Dans Une Revue The journal of human resources Année : 2022

Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance

Résumé

We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic “Gatekeeper Protocol” increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals’ ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40% in one year) following the reform, particularly among difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals that were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by selfscreening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.
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Dates et versions

hal-03689792 , version 1 (07-06-2022)

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  • HAL Id : hal-03689792 , version 1

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Mathilde Godard, Pierre Koning, Martin Lindeboom. Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance. The journal of human resources, 2022, 57 (3). ⟨hal-03689792⟩
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